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ABSTRACT
We propose a theory of securities market under- and overreactions based on two
well-known psychological biases: investor overconfidence about the precision of
private information; and biased self-attribution, which causes asymmetric shifts
in investors’ confidence as a function of their investment outcomes. We show that
overconfidence implies negative long-lag autocorrelations, excess volatility, and,
when managerial actions are correlated with stock mispricing, public-event-based
return predictability. Biased self-attribution adds positive short-lag autocorrela-
tions ~“momentum”!, short-run earnings “drift,” but negative correlation between
future returns and long-term past stock market and accounting performance. The
theory also offers several untested implications and implications for corporate fi-
nancial policy.
IN RECENT YEARS A BODY OF evidence on security returns has presented a sharp
challenge to the traditional view that securities are rationally priced to re-
f lect all publicly available information. Some of the more pervasive anoma-
lies can be classified as follows ~Appendix A cites the relevant literature!:
1. Event-based return predictability ~public-event-date average stock re-
turns of the same sign as average subsequent long-run abnormal per-
formance!
2. Short-term momentum ~positive short-term autocorrelation of stock re-
turns, for individual stocks and the market as a whole!
*Daniel is at Northwestern University and NBER, Hirshleifer is at the University of Mich-
igan, Ann Arbor, and Subrahmanyam is at the University of California at Los Angeles. We
thank two anonymous referees, the editor ~René Stulz!, Michael Brennan, Steve Buser, Werner
DeBondt, Eugene Fama, Simon Gervais, Robert Jones, Blake LeBaron, Tim Opler, Canice Pren-
dergast, Andrei Shleifer, Matt Spiegel, Siew Hong Teoh, and Sheridan Titman for helpful com-
ments and discussions, Robert Noah for excellent research assistance, and participants in the
National Bureau of Economic Research 1996 Asset Pricing Meeting, and 1997 Behavioral Fi-
nance Meeting, the 1997 Western Finance Association Meetings, the 1997 University of Chicago
Economics of Uncertainty Workshop, and finance workshops at the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the following universities: University of California at Berkeley, University of
California at Los Angeles, Columbia University, University of Florida, University of Houston,
University of Michigan, London Business School, London School of Economics, Northwestern
University, Ohio State University, Stanford University, and Washington University at St. Louis
for helpful comments. Hirshleifer thanks the Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Program of Asian
Finance and Economics for financial support.
THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE • VOL. LIII, NO. 6 • DECEMBER 1998
1839
3. Long-term reversal ~negative autocorrelation of short-term returns sep-
arated by long lags, or “overreaction”!
4. High volatility of asset prices relative to fundamentals
5. Short-run post-earnings announcement stock price “drift” in the direc-
tion indicated by the earnings surprise, but abnormal stock price per-
formance in the opposite direction of long-term earnings changes.
There remains disagreement over the interpretation of the above evidence
of predictability. One possibility is that these anomalies are chance devia-
tions to be expected under market efficiency ~Fama ~1998!!. We believe the
evidence does not accord with this viewpoint because some of the return
patterns are strong and regular. The size, book-to-market, and momentum
effects are present both internationally and in different time periods. Also,
the pattern mentioned in ~1! above obtains for the great majority of event
studies.
Alternatively, these patterns could represent variations in rational risk
premia. However, based on the high Sharpe ratios ~relative to the market!
apparently achievable with simple trading strategies ~MacKinlay ~1995!!,
any asset pricing model consistent with these patterns would have to have
extremely variable marginal utility across states. Campbell and Cochrane
~1994! find that a utility function with extreme habit persistence is required
to explain the predictable variation in market returns. To be consistent with
cross-sectional predictability findings ~e.g., on size, book-to-market, and mo-
mentum!, a model would presumably require even more extreme variation
in marginal utilities. Also, the model would require that marginal utilities
covary strongly with the returns on the size, book-to-market, and momen-
tum portfolios. But when the data are examined, no such correlation is ob-
vious. Given this evidence, it seems reasonable to consider explanations for
the observed return patterns based on imperfect rationality.
Moreover, there are important corporate financing and payout patterns
that seem potentially related to market anomalies. Firms tend to issue eq-
uity ~rather than debt! after rises in market value and when the firm or
industry book-to-market ratio is low. There are industry-specific financing
and repurchase booms, perhaps designed to exploit industry-level mispric-
ings. Transactions such as takeovers that often rely on securities financing
are also prone to industry booms and quiet periods.
Although it is not obvious how the empirical securities market phenomena
can be captured plausibly in a model based on perfect investor rationality, no
psychological ~“behavioral”! theory for these phenomena has won general
acceptance. Some aspects of the patterns seem contradictory, such as appar-
ent market underreaction in some contexts and overreaction in others. Ex-
planations have been offered for particular anomalies, but we have lacked
both an integrated theory to explain these phenomena and out-of-sample
empirical implications to test proposed explanations.
A general criticism often raised by economists against psychological theo-
ries is that, in a given economic setting, the universe of conceivable irratio-
nal behavior patterns is essentially unrestricted. Thus, it is sometimes claimed
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that allowing for irrationality opens a Pandora’s box of ad hoc stories that
will have little out-of-sample predictive power. However, DeBondt and Tha-
ler ~1995! argue that a good psychological finance theory will be grounded
on psychological evidence about how people actually behave. We concur, and
also believe that such a theory should allow for the rational side of investor
decisions. To deserve consideration a theory should be parsimonious, explain
a range of anomalous patterns in different contexts, and generate new em-
pirical implications. The goal of this paper is to develop such a theory of
security markets.
Our theory is based on investor overconfidence, and variations in confi-
dence arising from biased self-attribution. The premise of investor overcon-
fidence is derived from a large body of evidence from cognitive psychological
experiments and surveys ~summarized in Section 1! which shows that indi-
viduals overestimate their own abilities in various contexts.
In financial markets, analysts and investors generate information for trad-
ing through means, such as interviewing management, verifying rumors,
and analyzing financial statements, that can be executed with varying de-
grees of skill. If an investor overestimates his ability to generate informa-
tion, or to identify the significance of existing data that others neglect, he
will underestimate his forecast errors. If he is more overconfident about
signals or assessments with which he has greater personal involvement, he
will tend to be overconfident about the information he has generated but not
about public signals. Thus, we define an overconfident investor as one who
overestimates the precision of his private information signal, but not of in-
formation signals publicly received by all.
We find that the overconfident-informed overweight the private signal rel-
ative to the prior, causing the stock price to overreact. When noisy public
information signals arrive, the inefficient deviation of the price is partially
corrected, on average. On subsequent dates, as more public information ar-
rives, the price, on average, moves still closer to the full-information value.
Thus, a central theme of this paper is that stock prices overreact to private
information signals and underreact to public signals. We show that this
overreaction-correction pattern is consistent with long-run negative autocor-
relation in stock returns, with unconditional excess volatility ~in excess of
what would obtain with fully rational investors!, and with further implica-
tions for volatility conditional on the type of signal.
The market’s tendency to over- or underreact to different types of infor-
mation allows us to address the remarkable pattern that the average an-
nouncement date returns in virtually all event studies are of the same sign
as the average post-event abnormal returns. Suppose that the market ob-
serves a public action taken by an informed party such as a firm at least
partly in response to market mispricing. For example, a rationally managed
firm may tend to buy back more of its stock when managers believe their
stock is undervalued by the market. In such cases, the corporate event will
ref lect the managers’ belief about the market valuation error, and will there-
fore predict future abnormal returns. In particular, repurchases, ref lecting
undervaluation, will predict positive abnormal returns, and equity offerings
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will predict the opposite. More generally, actions taken by any informed party
~such as a manager or analyst! in response to mispricing will predict future
returns. Consistent with this implication, many events studied in the em-
pirical literature can reasonably be viewed as being responsive to mispric-
ing, and have the abnormal return pattern discussed above. Section II.B.4
offers several additional implications about the occurrence of and price pat-
terns around corporate events and for corporate policy that are either un-
tested or have been confirmed only on a few specific events.
The empirical psychology literature reports not just overconfidence, but
that as individuals observe the outcomes of their actions, they update their
confidence in their own ability in a biased manner. According to attribution
theory ~Bem ~1965!!, individuals too strongly attribute events that confirm
the validity of their actions to high ability, and events that disconfirm the
action to external noise or sabotage. ~This relates to the notion of cognitive
dissonance, in which individuals internally suppress information that con-
f licts with past choices.!
If an investor trades based on a private signal, we say that a later public sig-
nal confirms the trade if it has the same sign ~good news arrives after a buy,
or bad news after a sell!. We assume that when an investor receives confirm-
ing public information, his confidence rises, but disconfirming information causes
confidence to fall only modestly, if at all. Thus, if an individual begins with un-
biased beliefs about his ability, new public signals on average are viewed as
confirming the validity of his private signal. This suggests that public infor-
mation can trigger further overreaction to a preceding private signal. We show
that such continuing overreaction causes momentum in security prices, but that
such momentum is eventually reversed as further public information gradu-
ally draws the price back toward fundamentals. Thus, biased self-attribution
implies short-run momentum and long-term reversals.
The dynamic analysis based on biased self-attribution can also lead to a
lag-dependent response to corporate events. Cash f low or earnings surprises
at first tend to reinforce confidence, causing a same-direction average stock
price trend. Later reversal of overreaction can lead to an opposing stock
price trend. Thus, the analysis is consistent with both short term post-
announcement stock price trends in the same direction as earnings sur-
prises and later reversals.
In our model, investors are quasi-rational in that they are Bayesian opti-
mizers except for their overassessment of valid private information, and their
biased updating of this precision. A frequent objection to models that explain
price anomalies as market inefficiencies is that fully rational investors should
be able to profit by trading against the mispricing. If wealth f lows from
quasi-rational to smart traders, eventually the smart traders may dominate
price-setting. However, for several reasons, we do not find this argument to
be compelling, as discussed in the conclusion.
Several other papers model overconfidence in various contexts. De Long
et al. ~1991! examine the profits of traders who underestimate risk when
prices are exogenous. Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman ~1994! exam-
ine how analyst0traders who overestimate the probability that they receive
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information before others will tend to herd in selecting stocks to study. Kyle
and Wang ~1997!, Odean ~1998!, and Wang ~1998! provide specifications of
overconfidence as overestimation of information precision, but do not distin-
guish between private and public signals in this regard ~see also Caballé and
Sakovics ~1996!!. Odean ~1998! examines overconfidence about, and conse-
quent overreaction to, a private signal, which results in excess volatility and
negative return autocorrelation. Because our model assumes that investors
are overconfident only about private signals, we obtain underreaction as
well as overreaction effects. Furthermore, because we consider time-varying
confidence, there is continuing overreaction to private signals over time.
Thus, in contrast to Odean, we find forces toward positive as well as nega-
tive autocorrelation; and we argue that overconfidence can decrease volatil-
ity around public news events.1
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam ~1998! show that our specifica-
tion of overconfidence can help explain several empirical puzzles regarding
cross-sectional patterns of security return predictability and investor behav-
ior. These puzzles include the ability of price-based measures ~dividend yield,
earnings0price, book-to-market, and firm market value! to predict future
stock returns, possible domination of b as a predictor of returns by price-
based variables, and differences in the relative ability of different price-
based measures to predict returns.
A few other recent studies have addressed both overreaction and under-
reaction in an integrated fashion. Shefrin ~1997! discusses how base rate
underweighting can shed light on the anomalous behavior of implied vola-
tilities in options markets. In a contemporaneous paper, Barberis, Shleifer,
and Vishny ~1998! offer an explanation for under- and overreactions based
on a learning model in which actual earnings follow a random walk, but
individuals believe that earnings either follow a steady growth trend or are
mean-reverting. Because their focus is on learning about the time-series
process of a performance measure such as earnings, they do not address the
sporadic events examined in most event studies. In another recent paper,
Hong and Stein ~1998! examine a setting where under- and overreactions
arise from the interaction of momentum traders and news watchers. Mo-
mentum traders make partial use of the information contained in recent
price trends and ignore fundamental news. News watchers rationally use
fundamental news but ignore prices. Our paper differs in focusing on
psychological evidence as a basis for assumptions about investor behavior.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I describes
psychological evidence of overconfidence and self-attribution bias. Section II
develops the basic model of overconfidence, and here we describe the eco-
nomic setting and define overconfidence. We analyze the equilibrium to de-
rive implications about stock price reactions to public versus private news,
short-term versus long-term autocorrelations, and volatility. Section III ex-
1 A recent revision of Odean’s paper offers a modified model that allows for underreaction.
This is developed in a static setting with no public signals, and therefore does not address
issues such as short-term versus long-term return autocorrelations, and event-study anomalies.
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amines time variation in overconfidence to derive implications about the
signs of short-term versus long-term return autocorrelations. Section IV con-
cludes by summarizing our findings, relating our analysis to the literature
on exogenous noise trading, and discussing issues related to the survival of
overconfident traders in financial markets.
I. Overconfidence and Biased Self-Attribution
Our theory relies on two psychological regularities: overconfidence and
attribution bias. In their summary of the microfoundations of behavioral
finance, DeBondt and Thaler ~1995! state that “perhaps the most robust
finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are overconfident.” Ev-
idence of overconfidence has been found in several contexts. Examples in-
clude psychologists, physicians and nurses, engineers, attorneys, negotiators,
entrepreneurs, managers, investment bankers, and market professionals such
as security analysts and economic forecasters.2 Further, some evidence sug-
gests that experts tend to be more overconfident than relatively inexperi-
enced individuals ~Griffin and Tversky ~1992!!. Psychological evidence also
indicates that overconfidence is more severe for diffuse tasks ~e.g., making
diagnoses of illnesses!, which require judgment, than for mechanical tasks
~e.g., solving arithmetic problems!; and more severe for tasks with delayed
feedback as opposed to tasks that provide immediate and conclusive outcome
feedback ~see Einhorn ~1980!!. Fundamental valuation of securities ~fore-
casting long-term cash f lows! requires judgment about open-ended issues,
and feedback is noisy and deferred. We therefore focus on the implications of
overconfidence for financial markets.3 Our theory assumes that investors
view themselves as more able to value securities than they actually are, so
that they underestimate their forecast error variance. This is consistent with
evidence that people overestimate their own abilities, and perceive them-
selves more favorably than they are viewed by others.4
Several experimental studies find that individuals underestimate their
error variance in making predictions, and overweight their own forecasts
relative to those of others.5
The second aspect of our theory is biased self-attribution: The confidence of
the investor in our model grows when public information is in agreement with
his information, but it does not fall commensurately when public information
2 See respectively: Oskamp ~1965!; Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead, ~1981!, Bau-
mann, Deber, Thompson, ~1991!; ~Kidd ~1970!; Wagenaar and Keren ~1986!; Neale and Bazer-
man ~1990!; Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg ~1988!; Russo and Schoemaker ~1992!; Vonholstein
~1972!; Ahlers and Lakonishok ~1983!, Elton, Gruber, and Gultekin ~1984!, Froot and Frankel
~1989!, DeBondt and Thaler ~1990!, DeBondt ~1991!. See Odean ~1998! for a good summary of
empirical research on overconfidence.
3 Odean ~1998! ~Sec. II.D! also makes a good argument for why overconfidence should dom-
inate in financial markets. Also, Bernardo and Welch ~1998! offer an evolutionary explanation
for why individuals should be overconfident.
4 Greenwald ~1980!, Svenson ~1981!, Cooper et al. 1988, and Taylor and Brown ~1988!.
5 See Alpert and Raiffa ~1982!, Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein ~1977!, Batchelor and Dua
~1992!, and the discussions of Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips ~1982! and Yates ~1990!.
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contradicts his private information. The psychological evidence indicates that
people tend to credit themselves for past success, and blame external factors
for failure ~Fischhoff ~1982!, Langer and Roth ~1975!, Miller and Ross ~1975!,
Taylor and Brown ~1988!!. As Langer and Roth ~1975! put it, “Heads I win, tails
it’s chance”; see also the discussion of De Long et al. ~1991!.
II. The Basic Model: Constant Confidence
This section develops the model with static confidence. Section III consid-
ers time-varying confidence. Each member of a continuous mass of agents is
overconfident in the sense that if he receives a signal, he overestimates its
precision. We refer to those who receive the signal as the informed, I, and
those who do not as the uninformed, U. For tractability, we assume that the
informed are risk neutral and that the uninformed are risk averse.
Each individual is endowed with a basket containing security shares, and
a risk-free numeraire that is a claim to one unit of terminal-period wealth.
There are four dates. At date 0, individuals begin with their endowments
and identical prior beliefs, and trade solely for optimal risk-transfer pur-
poses. At date 1, I receives a common noisy private signal about underlying
security value and trades with U.6 At date 2, a noisy public signal arrives,
and further trade occurs. At date 3, conclusive public information arrives,
the security pays a liquidating dividend, and consumption occurs. All ran-
dom variables are independent and normally distributed.
The risky security generates a terminal value of u, which is assumed to be
normally distributed with mean Nu and variance su2 . For most of the paper we
set Nu 5 0 without loss of generality. The private information signal received
by I at date 1 is
s1 5 u 1 e, ~1!
where e ; N~0,se2 ! ~so the signal precision is 10se2 !. U correctly assesses the
error variance, but I underestimates it to be sC2 , se2 . The differing beliefs
about the noise variance are common knowledge to all.7 Similarly, the date
2 public signal is
s2 5 u 1 h, ~2!
6 Some previous models with common private signals include Grossman and Stiglitz ~1980!,
Admati and Pf leiderer ~1988!, and Hirshleifer et al. ~1994!. If some analysts and investors use the
same information sources to assess security values, and interpret them in similar ways, the error
terms in their signals will be correlated. For simplicity, we assume this correlation is unity; how-
ever, similar results would obtain under imperfect ~but nonzero! correlation in signal noise terms.
7 It is not crucial for the analysis that the uninformed correctly assesses the private signal
variance, only that he does not underestimate it as much as the informed does. Also, because U
does not possess a signal to be overconfident about, he could alternatively be interpreted as a
fully rational trader who trades to exploit market mispricing. Furthermore, most of the results
will obtain even if investors are symmetrical both in their overconfidence and their signals.
Results similar to those we derive would apply in a setting where identical overconfident in-
dividuals receive correlated private signals.
Investor Psychology and Market Reactions 1845
where the noise term h ; N~0,sp2 ! is independent of u and e. Its variance sp2
is correctly estimated by all investors.
Our simplifying assumption that all private information precedes all pub-
lic information is not needed for the model’s implications. It is essential that
at least some noisy public information arrives after a private signal. The
model’s implications stand if, more realistically, additional public informa-
tion precedes or is contemporaneous with the private signal.
The formal role of the uninformed in this paper is minimal because prices
are set by the risk-neutral informed traders. The rationale for the assump-
tion of overconfidence is that the investor has a personal attachment to his
own signal. This implies some other set of investors who do not receive the
same signal. Also, similar results will hold if both groups of investors are
risk averse, so that both groups inf luence price. We have verified this ana-
lytically in a simplified version of the model. So long as the uninformed are
not risk-neutral price setters, the overconfident informed will push price
away from fully rational values in the direction described here.
A. Equilibrium Prices and Trades
Because the informed traders are risk neutral, prices at each date satisfy
P1 5 EC @u6u 1 e# ~3!
P2 5 EC @u6u 1 e,u 1 h# , ~4!
where the subscript C denotes the fact that the expectation operator is cal-
culated based on the informed traders’ confident beliefs. Trivially, P3 5 u. By

























where D [ su2~sC2 1 sp2 ! 1 sC2 sp2 .
B. Implications for Price Behavior
This section examines the implications of static confidence for over- and
underreactions to information and empirical securities returns patterns. Sub-
section B.1 examines price reactions to public and private information, sub-
section B.2 examines the implications for price-change autocorrelations, and
subsection B.3 examines implications for event-studies. Subsection B.4 dis-
cusses some as-yet-untested empirical implications of the model.
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B.1. Overreaction and Underreaction
Figure 1 illustrates the average price path following a positive ~upper curve!
or negative ~lower curve! date 1 private signal ~date 3' of the graph has not
yet been introduced!. At this point we focus on the solid lines. The upper
curve, an impulse-response function, shows the expected prices conditional
on a private signal of unit magnitude arriving at time 1. The thin horizontal
line shows the fully rational price level.
Overconfidence in the private signal u 1 e causes the date 1 stock price to
overreact to this new information. At date 2, when noisy public information
signals arrive, the inefficient deviation of the price is partially corrected, on
average. The same is true on subsequent public information arrival dates.
We call the part of the impulse response prior to the peak or trough the
overreaction phase, and the later section the correction phase.
This overreaction and correction imply that the covariance between the
date 1 price change and the date 2 price change, cov~P2 2 P1, P1 2 P0!, is
negative. ~Appendix B provides detailed expressions for the covariances de-
scribed here.! Further, the overreaction to the private signal is partially
corrected by the date 2 public signal, and fully corrected upon release of the
date 3 public signal, so that cov~P3 2 P1, P1 2 P0! , 0. This price change
reversal arises from the continuing correction to the date 1 overreaction.
Finally, the continuing correction starting at date 2 and ending at date 3
causes price changes at the time of and subsequent to the public signal to be
positively correlated, so that cov~P3 2 P2, P2 2 P1! . 0. We thus have the
following proposition.
Figure 1. Average price as a function of time with overconfident investors. This figure
shows price as a function of time for the dynamic model of Section III with ~dashed line! and
without ~solid line! self-attribution bias.
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PROPOSITION 1: If investors are overconfident, then:
1. Price moves resulting from private information arrival are on average
partially reversed in the long run.
2. Price moves in reaction to the arrival of public information are posi-
tively correlated with later price changes.
The pattern of correlations described in Proposition 1 is potentially testable
by examining whether long-run reversals following days with public news
events are smaller than reversals on days without such events. The price
behavior around public announcements has implications for corporate event
studies ~see Subsection B.3!.
B.2. Unconditional Serial Correlations and Volatility
Return autocorrelations in well-known studies of momentum and reversal
are calculated without conditioning on the arrival of a public information
signal. To calculate a return autocorrelation that does not condition on whether
private versus public information has arrived, consider an experiment where
the econometrician randomly picks consecutive dates for price changes ~dates
1 and 2, versus dates 2 and 3!. The date 2 and 3 price changes are positively
correlated, but the date 1 and 2 price changes are negatively correlated.
Suppose that the econometrician is equally likely to pick either pair of con-
secutive dates. Then the overall autocorrelation is negative.
PROPOSITION 2: If investors are overconfident, price changes are uncondition-
ally negatively autocorrelated at both short and long lags.
Thus, the constant-confidence model accords with long-run reversals ~nega-
tive long-lag autocorrelations! but not with short-term momentum ~positive
short-lag autocorrelation!. However, the short-lag autocorrelation will be pos-
itive in a setting where the extremum in the impulse response function is
sufficiently smooth, because the negative autocovariance of price changes
surrounding a smooth extremum will be low in absolute terms. Such a set-
ting, based on biased self-attribution and outcome-dependent confidence, is
considered in Section III.
Overconfidence causes wider swings at date 1 away from fundamentals,
thereby causing excess price volatility around private signals ~var~P1 2 P0!!,
as in Odean ~1998!. Greater overconfidence also causes relative underweight-
ing of the public signal, which tends to reduce date 2 variance. However, the
wide date 1 swings create a greater need for corrective price moves at dates
2 and 3, so that greater overconfidence can either decrease or increase the
volatility around public signals ~var~P2 2 P1!!. ~Explicit expressions for the
variances of this section are contained in Appendix B.! Consider again an
econometrician who does not condition on the occurrence of private or public
news arrival. When calculating price change variances he gives equal weight
to price changes P1 2 P0, P2 2 P1, and P3 2 P2. The unconditional volatility
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is therefore just the arithmetic mean of var ~P3 2 P2!, var~P2 2 P1!, and
var~P1 2 P0!. Excess volatility is the difference between the volatility with over-
confidence and the volatility when the noise variance is perceived correctly.
Let the subscript R denote the volatility if all individuals were rational.
We define the date t proportional excess volatility as
VtE [




1. Overconfidence increases volatility around private signals, can increase
or decrease volatility around public signals, and increases uncondi-
tional volatility.
2. The proportional excess volatility is greater around the private signal
than around the public signal.
Thus, consistent with the findings of Odean ~1998!, when there are only
private signals, there is a general tendency for overconfidence to create
excess volatility. Excess volatility is not an automatic implication of any
model with imperfect rationality. For example, if investors are underconfi-
dent, sC2 . se2 , then there will be insufficient volatility relative to the
rational level. Also, in contrast to Odean, Proposition 3 implies that in
samples broken down by types of news event, either excess or deficient
volatility may be possible.
B.3. Event Study Implications
Many recent studies have investigated abnormal average return perfor-
mance or “drift” following public news arrival. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, a striking regularity in virtually all of these studies is that average
post-event abnormal price trends are of the same sign as the average initial
event-date reaction. We now slightly generalize the model to address this
event-based return predictability.
Sophisticated managers or analysts who are not overconfident are likely
to selectively undertake certain visible actions, such as repurchasing shares
or making buy recommendations, when a firm’s shares are undervalued by
the market. We will show that the nature of the stock price reaction to an
event depends critically on whether or not the event is related to the mis-
pricing by the market.
We assume that the date 2 signal is no longer public, but is instead re-
ceived privately by the firm’s manager ~or other individual such as an ana-
lyst!, and that this individual takes an action ~the “event”! that is publicly
observed and fully reveals the signal. Let P2C~s2! be the valuation that would
be placed on the security by an overconfident investor at date 2 were he to
observe the signal s2 in addition to his signal s1. ~Because we examine events
that fully reveal s2, this is in equilibrium just the post-event stock price P2.!
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Let P2R~s2! be the comparable valuation that would be set by a fully rational
investor. The date 2 mispricing then is defined as the difference P2R~s2! 2
P2C~s2!. We define different kinds of events as follows.
Definition. An event is a random variable that depends only on the infor-
mation signals s1 and s2. A nonselective event is an event that is independent
of the date 2 mispricing P2R~s2! 2 P2C~s2!. A selective event is an event whose
occurrence and0or magnitude depends on the date 2 mispricing.
A simple type of nonselective event is a random variable that is linearly
related only to the second signal s2.
PROPOSITION 4: If overconfident investors observe a nonselective event:
1. The true expected post-announcement abnormal price change is zero.
2. Conditional on the pre-event return, the covariance between the
announcement-date and the post-announcement price change is posi-
tive; that is, cov~P3 2 P2, s26P1 2 P0! . 0.
Because a nonselective event is an action that is unrelated to the pricing
error at date 2, it tells us nothing about mean future price movements. Al-
though the market underreacts to the event, it is equally likely to be under-
reacting downward as upward. Part 1 therefore indicates that there will be
no systematic post-announcement drift following events that are unrelated
to the prior market mispricing. Thus, Proposition 4 refutes the conventional
interpretation of drift as being equivalent to underreaction to new information.
The lack of event-based predictive power for future returns is surprising
given the positive autocorrelation of event-date and post-event price changes
~Proposition 1!. However, even though the event is unrelated to the prior
mispricing, the more underpriced the security, the more positive on average
will be the stock price reaction to further news. Thus, a favorable event-date
stock price change is associated with a positive future average trend. Clearly,
then, even though the event itself does not predict future returns, the mar-
ket is inefficient.
Part 2 of Proposition 4 predicts larger post-event average returns the more
the nonselective event ~perhaps a cash f low surprise! and the pre-event stock
price runup are in opposition ~e.g., positive pre-event runup and negative
event!.8 Intuitively, holding constant the private signal ~as ref lected in P1!,
the higher is the public signal, the more likely that the fundamental u is
high, and therefore the bigger the average shortfall of the private signal
relative to the fundamental. Thus, a higher public signal is associated with
a larger ~more positive! post-event return.
Both Parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 4 can be tested using data on specific
nonselective events. These are presumably events that are not initiated by
an informed party such as a manager with an incentive to take into account
8 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we explore this issue.
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mispricing. Such events might include news about product demand that em-
anates from outside of the company ~e.g., news about competitors’ actions!,
or regulatory and legislative outcomes ~e.g., FDA decisions on drugs pro-
posed by a pharmaceutical company!.
We now show that selective public events, that is, events that are corre-
lated with pre-event stock mispricing, will forecast future price changes.
Consider a manager who observes P1 ~and therefore infers the private signal
s1! and receives his own signal s2 at date 2. The manager can undertake a
debt0equity exchange offering, and the attractiveness of a larger exchange
depends on how high the market price is relative to fundamental value. He
can condition the size of the offering on the mispricing at date 2, which he
knows precisely, because he knows both s1 and s2. It can easily be shown
that in this setting the date 2 pricing error is proportional to the expected
error in the private signal, e* [ E @e6P1,s2# , where the expectation is again
taken with respect to rational beliefs. For tractability, we consider selective
events that are linear functions of the date 2 mispricing.
When e* , 0, the manager believes the market has undervalued the firm
and that the firm can “profit” by exchanging debt for equity; the more un-
dervalued the firm, the greater the size of the offering. If e* . 0, an equity-
for-debt swap would be preferred instead. It is easy to show that
E @P3 2 P2 6e* . 0# , 0 , E @P3 2 P2 6e* , 0#; ~8!
that is, events taken in response to market undervaluation ~e.g., repurchase!
are associated with high post-event returns, and events taken in response to
overvaluation ~e.g., new issue! are associated with low post-event returns.
PROPOSITION 5: If investors are overconfident, then selective events that are
initiated when the stock is undervalued (overvalued) by the market will on
average be associated with positive (negative) announcement-date abnormal
price changes and will on average be followed by positive (negative) post-
announcement abnormal price changes.
In Proposition 4 there was underreaction to news arrival but no post-event
drift. Here, drift results from the combination of underreaction and event
selection based on market mispricing. Thus, the model offers the new em-
pirical implication that the phenomenon of abnormal post-event drift will be
concentrated in events that select for market mispricing. Evidence recently
brought to our attention supports this implication. Cornett, Mehran, and
Tehranian ~1998! find that involuntary issues undertaken by banks to meet
capital requirements are not associated with postevent drift, whereas vol-
untary bank issues are associated with negative post-event abnormal per-
formance. Because involuntary issues are likely to be less selective than
voluntary ones, this evidence is consistent with the model.
If the announcement of an upcoming initial public offering ~IPO!, like a
seasoned equity offering ~SEO! announcement, ref lects managers’ “bad news,”
then Proposition 5 implies long-run underperformance following IPOs as well.
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We have no data on the announcement-date reaction to an upcoming IPO
because IPO firms are private prior to the event. However, the consistent
findings of negative stock price reactions to seasoned equity issue announce-
ments, and of inferior post-IPO accounting performance ~Jain and Kini ~1994!,
Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah ~1997!, Teoh, Wong, and Rao ~1998!, Loughran
and Ritter ~1997!!, suggest that an IPO announcement is indeed, on average,
bad news.9 If so, the evidence that IPOs internationally exhibit long-run
average underperformance for several years after the issue ~Ritter ~1991!,
Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist ~1994!! is consistent with the model.
The event-based return predictability of Proposition 5 is not equivalent to
underreaction to corporate events. Underreaction to public signals ~as im-
plied by overconfidence! induces positive autocorrelation of returns at the
event date. However, the event realization ~in contrast to the event-date
return! does not predict future abnormal returns unless event size0occurrence
is correlated with prior market mispricing.
We have interpreted the model in terms of firms buying or selling shares
to profit from mispricing. An alternative interpretation is that a manager
with favorable information ~e* , 0! would like to signal good news to the
market, and chooses an action ~such as a repurchase, dividend, debt for eq-
uity swap, or stock split! to reveal his information. With a continuous signal,
such behavior typically leads to full revelation, consistent with our assump-
tion that e* is revealed to the market at the event date.10
Whether the model of this section is consistent with the well-known phe-
nomenon of post-earnings announcement “drift” depends on whether earn-
ings announcements are selective events. Earnings reports are favorably
selective if managers report higher earnings, ceteris paribus, when the mar-
ket undervalues their firm. Managers are motivated to do so if they are
averse to low levels of short-term stock price or personal reputation.11 Fur-
ther, managers have a great deal of discretion over earnings levels both
through accounting adjustments ~accruals!, and by shifting the timing of
actual cash f lows. Accounting adjustments seem to ref lect managers’ inside
information, as evidenced by the announcement effect of accruals on returns
~distinct from the effect of cash f lows!; see Wilson ~1986!. There is extensive
evidence that managers use their accounting discretion strategically to achieve
their goals, such as meeting loan covenant requirements, winning proxy fights,
obtaining earnings-based bonuses, and avoiding taxes; Teoh, Wong, and Rao
9 The initial positive return relative to issue price ~“underpricing”! is not an announcement
reaction to the news that an IPO will occur; this news is released earlier.
10 The model’s event study predictions also apply to events undertaken by outsiders who
have information about the firm. An example is an analyst’s recommendation to buy or sell
shares of the firm. Thus, the analysis is consistent with evidence on stock price drift following
analyst buy and sell recommendations mentioned in Appendix A.
11 Either concave utility or risk of dismissal can make managers averse to a low stock price;
a rising disutility from low price is a common model assumption ~see, e.g., Harris and Raviv
~1985!!. If managers prefer a high short-term stock price but thereby risk incurring a penalty
for overly aggressive reports, then the net benefit from reporting higher earnings may be greater,
ceteris paribus, when the stock is more undervalued.
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~1998! reference about thirty such studies. If managers adjust earnings
selectively, Proposition 5 can account for post-earnings drift. The dynamic
confidence setting of Section III provides a distinct explanation for post-
earnings announcement drift that obtains even if earnings are nonselective.
Because the date 1 expected value of e* is perfectly positively correlated
with P1 ~they both are linearly increasing functions of s1!, variables such as
market0book or runup ~P1 2 Nu! are potential measures of mispricing. We
have assumed that the size of a selective event depends on the size of the
misvaluation; it follows that the size and sign of the selective event varies
with the measures of mispricing. We therefore have the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 6:
1. The expected size of a positive (negative) selective event is increasing
(decreasing) in measures of the firm’s mispricing.
2. The probability that a positive (negative) selective event will occur in-
creases (decreases) with measures of the firm’s mispricing.
We tentatively identify mispricing with variables that contain market price
such as market0book ratios. The analysis then predicts that repurchases
and other favorable events will tend to occur when market, industry, or firm
market0book or price0earnings ratios are low, and that equity issuance and
other adverse selective events will tend to occur when such ratios are high.
This is consistent with evidence that the frequency of IPOs is positively
related to the market0book ratio in the company’s industrial sectors ~Paga-
no, Panetta, and Zingales ~1998!!, and that in many countries the value and
number of IPOs is positively associated with stock market levels ~Loughran
et al. ~1994!, Rees ~1996!, Ljungqvist ~1997!!.
The analysis also implies that event-date price changes ~for a given type of
event! should be positively correlated with post-announcement returns. This
is just underreaction, and follows under the conditions of Proposition 1.12 Also,
in the model, because the pre-event price runup maps one-to-one with market
mispricing, better pre-event price performance is associated with worse post-
event performance ~either including or excluding the event date!. This follows
because cov~P3 2 P2, P1 2 P0! , 0 and cov~P3 2 P1, P1 2 P0! , 0. Intuitively,
mispricing arises from overreaction to private information, firms select events
based on mispricing, and this causes post-event returns to be related to pre-
event returns. However, the latter implication is not robust to reasonable gen-
eralization of the assumptions to allow for the possibility that public information
can arrive at date 0 or date 1.
Consider, for example, the case of dividend announcements. Firms that
have been performing well enough to generate a lot of cash are more likely
to boost dividends. Thus, a dividend increase will be associated not only with
market undervaluation at date 2 ~unfavorable date 1 private signal!, but
12 Proposition 1 is based on a nonselective news event, namely, the arrival of s2. Even though
s2 is private information here, the result is the same because s2 is fully revealed by the corpo-
rate action, so that P2 is identical in all states to what it would be if s2 were made public
directly. Thus, cov~P3 2 P2, P2 2 P1! is the same in both cases.
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also with good past performance ~favorable date 0 or 1 public signal!. In this
scenario, while the event-date and post-event mean abnormal returns are
both positive, the sign of the pre-event mean return will be ambiguous. We
have verified formally that if the event choice ~dividend! increases with both
a past ~date 1! public signal and the degree of market undervaluation, then
the event may be associated with a positive average runup, a positive aver-
age event date return, and a positive average post-event return.13
More generally, whether prior runup ~or other price-related indicators such
the fundamental0price ratios! is a measure of mispricing depends on whether
the event in question is mainly selective for mispricing, or depends heavily
on past fundamental public performance measures ~such as past earnings!.
Many events, such as dividends and stock splits, may be selective owing to
a signaling motive. But events in which the firm trades against the market,
such as exchange offers, repurchases, and new issues, provide an incentive
to earn a trading profit. This provides an incentive to be selective above and
beyond any signaling motive. Thus, runup and price0fundamental ratios should
be better measures of mispricing for such market-exploitation events than
for pure signaling events.
B.4. Empirical Implications
The model provides the following implications, which are either untested
or have been tested only on a subset of possible events:
1. Average post-event returns of the same sign as average event-date re-
turns for selective events, and zero postevent drift for nonselective events
2. A positive correlation between initial event-date stock price reactions
and post-event performance for public events
3. A positive correlation between the size of a selective event ~e.g., a re-
purchase or the announcement of a toehold stake! and post-event re-
turn, but no such correlation for nonselective events ~e.g., news disclosed
by outside sources, especially if it is macroeconomic or industry-wide,
such as news about product demand or input prices, production pro-
cesses, and regulatory events!
4. Larger post-event average returns the more the nonselective event and
the pre-event stock price runup are in opposition
5. Greater average long-term reversal of price moves occurring on dates
when there are no public news events about a firm reported in public
news media than price moves occurring on public event dates
13 Fama ~1998! argues that our approach implies that mean pre-event abnormal returns will
have the same sign as mean postevent abnormal returns, and that the evidence does not sup-
port this implication. As discussed above, event occurrence is likely to depend on past public
information, in which case the model implies that average pre-event runup can have either the
same or the opposite sign as average postevent abnormal returns. Propositions 4 and 5 provide
model implications for event study returns that are robust with respect to pre-event public
information arrival. The evidence generally supports these predictions.
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6. Greater selective event sizes ~e.g., greater repurchases! when mispric-
ing measures ~e.g., price0fundamental ratios or past runup! are high
7. Greater probability of a good-news ~bad news! selective event when the
security is more underpriced ~overpriced!.
The overconfidence theory has further implications for managerial policy
related to implications ~6! and ~7! above. We expect firms to issue securities
when they believe their stocks are overvalued. If investors are overconfi-
dent, such overvaluation may be measured by recent increases in firm, in-
dustry, or aggregate stock market prices, or with high price0fundamental
ratios. Conversely, firms should repurchase after rundowns when the mar-
ket appears to undervalue the firm. Thus, if managers act to exploit mis-
pricing, there will be both general and industry-specific financing and
repurchase booms.
The theory also suggests that when the market undervalues the firm, there
should be a tilt away from dividends toward repurchase. Further, when a
stock is underpriced ~perhaps after rundowns or when firm or aggregate
market0book ratios are low!, the firm, acting in current shareholders’ inter-
ests should, ceteris paribus, favor rights over public issues. Similarly, the
firm should tilt toward debt rather than equity issues to avoid diluting cur-
rent shareholders. Thus, the theory offers a possible solution to what Opler
and Titman ~1996! call a major puzzle from the perspective of optimal cap-
ital structure theory, that after a rise in market prices, firms tend to issue
more equity rather than debt.14
These predictions seem quite intuitive, making it easy to forget that the
directions would reverse in alternative models of market mispricing. For
example, in a setting where the market always underreacts, firms with high
recent runups or low fundamental0price ratios will, ceteris paribus, tend to
be undervalued, so that ~inconsistent with the evidence! we would observe
repurchases rather than equity issues in such situations.
III. Outcome-Dependent Confidence
The implications described so far are based on a fixed confidence level.
However, psychological evidence and theory suggest that actions and result-
ing outcomes affect confidence; events that confirm an individual’s beliefs
and actions tend to boost confidence too much, and disconfirming events
weaken confidence too little ~see Section I!. Taking into account this psycho-
logical pattern leads to implications similar to those in the static section,
except that there is also short-run momentum in stock prices and event-
based predictability even for nonselective events.
14 However, Jung, Kim, and Stulz ~1996! find that firms often depart from the pecking order
~i.e., the preference of debt over equity! because of agency considerations, and that debt and
equity issuers both have negative average abnormal long-run stock returns that are not sta-
tistically different from one another.
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Consider an informed individual who initially is not overconfident, and
who buys or sells a security based on his private information. A public signal
confirms his trade if they have the same sign ~“buy” and a positive signal, or
“sell” and a negative signal!. We assume that if the later public signal con-
firms his trade, the individual becomes more confident, and if it disconfirms
his confidence decreases by little or remains constant. This implies that, on
average, public information can increase confidence, intensifying overreac-
tion. The continuing overreaction leads to positive autocorrelation during
the initial overreaction phase. As repeated public information arrival draws
the price back toward fundamentals, the initial overreaction is gradually
reversed in the long run.
The process described above yields a hump-shaped impulse response func-
tion for a private signal, as illustrated by the dashed lines in Figure 1. ~The
date 001 line overlaps the solid lines showing the impulse response for the
static model.! The figure shows two possible date 1 prices, and the paths for
expected price conditional on the date 1 move. It can be seen that with
outcome-dependent confidence, there are smooth overreaction and correction
phases. Pairs of returns drawn from these phases will be positively corre-
lated, whereas the pair that straddles the extremum will be negatively cor-
related. The overall autocorrelation involving contiguous price changes will
be positive if the extremum-straddling negative correlation is sufficiently
small. However, price changes that are separated by long lags are likely to
straddle the extremum of the impulse-response function, and will therefore
exhibit negative autocorrelations. Thus, the pattern of momentum at short
lags and reversal at long lags arises naturally from the model.
We present two models with dynamic confidence that capture this intu-
ition. The model presented in Section A below is tractable but highly styl-
ized. The model presented in Section B allows us to develop more complex
implications, but can only be solved by simulation.
A. The Simple Model with Outcome Dependent Confidence
We modify the basic model of Section II as follows. We still allow for, but
no longer require, initial overconfidence, so sC2 # se2 . For tractability, the
public signal is now discrete, with s2 5 1 or 21 released at date 2. We as-
sume that the precision assessed by the investors at date 2 about their ear-
lier private signal depends on the realization of the public signal in the
following way. If
sign~u 1 e! 5 sign~s2!, ~9!
confidence increases, so investors’ assessment of noise variance decreases to
sC
2 2 k, 0 , k , sC2 . If
sign~u 1 e! Þ sign~s2!, ~10!
confidence remains constant, so noise variance is still believed to be sC2 .
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The probability of receiving a public signal 11 is denoted by p. For a high
value to be a favorable indicator of value, p must tend to increase with u.
However, allowing p to vary with u creates intractable nonnormalities. We
therefore examine the limiting case where the signal is virtually pure noise,
so that p is a constant. ~Appendix C provides a discrete model that derives
similar results using an informative public signal.!
Given normality of all random variables, the date 1 price is






~u 1 e!. ~11!
The date 0 price P0 5 0, the prior mean. If sign~u 1 e! Þ sign ~s2!, then
confidence is constant. Because the public signal is virtually uninformative,
the price ~virtually! does not move at date 2. However, if sign~u 1 e! 5 sign
~s2!, then the new price is calculated using the new level of the assessed







~u 1 e!. ~12!
A.1. Implications of the Simple Model
Explicit calculations and expressions for covariances for this subsection
are in Appendix D. It can easily be shown that
cov~P2 2 P1, P1 2 P0! . 0. ~13!
Thus, the model shows that the overreaction phase, not just the correction
phase, can contribute positively to short-term momentum. As a result,
cov~P3 2 P1, P1 2 P0! , 0; ~14!
cov~P3 2 P2, P2 2 P1! , 0, ~15!
because the dates 1 and 2 overreactions must be reversed in the long term.
Intuitively, further dates of noisy public information arrival should even-
tually cause the mispricing to be corrected ~as long as confidence does not
explode infinitely!. This process causes positive autocorrelation during the
correction phase, just as in the basic model of Section II. To examine this, let
us add a date 3' between dates 2 and 3, where a public signal u 1 h is
released. For simplicity, we assume that overconfidence is not affected by
the release of the second public signal. As in Section II, h is a zero mean,
normally distributed variable with variance sp2 , and is independent of all
other random variables. The price at date 3' when overconfidence is not
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revised at date 2 is given by equation ~6!. When overconfidence is revised at
date 2, the price at date 3', denoted by P3'C , is given by the same expression

















where D [ su2~sC2 2 k 1 sp2 ! 1 ~sC2 2 k!sp2 .
With the extra date added to the model, it is easy to show that all of the
remaining single-period price-change autocorrelations are negative except
for cov~P3 2 P3' , P3' 2 P2!, which is positive. This can be explained as follows.
Date 2 is the extremum of the impulse response function ~the “hump” or
“trough” date after which the average correction begins!. By equation ~D1!
in Appendix D and the above, the single-period price-change single-lag auto-
correlations that fall entirely within either the overreaction phase or within
the correction phase are positive, and the single-period price-change single-
lag autocorrelation that straddles the extremum is negative.15
Under appropriate parameter assumptions, the negative single-lag auto-
correlation surrounding the extremum is arbitrarily close to zero. This oc-
curs if either the extra overreaction or the start of the correction is weak ~or
both!. The extra overreaction is small if confidence is boosted only slightly
~k . 0 small! when an investor’s trade is confirmed by public news. The
initial correction is slight if the further noisy public signal is not very in-
formative ~sh2 large!. When parameter values are such that this straddling
autocorrelation is not too large, it is outweighed by the positive autocorre-
lations during the hearts of the overreaction or correction phases. In other
words, an econometrician calculating autocorrelations unconditionally would
find, in a large sample, a positive single-lag autocorrelation. In contrast,
longer-lag pairs of price changes that straddle the extremum of the impulse
response function will tend to be opposed, because a price change drawn
from the overreaction phase tends to be negatively correlated with a price
change drawn from the correction phase. Thus, the theory provides a joint
explanation for both short-term momentum and long-term reversals.
PROPOSITION 7: If investor confidence changes because of biased self-attribution,
and if overreaction or correction is sufficiently gradual, then stock price changes
exhibit unconditional short-lag positive autocorrelation (“momentum”) and
long-lag negative autocorrelation (“reversal”).
According to Jegadeesh and Titman ~1993!, their momentum evidence is “ . . .
consistent with delayed price reactions to firm-specific information.” Prop-
osition 7 offers a very different possible interpretation, namely, that momen-
tum occurs not because the market is slow to react to news but because the
15 Formally, cov~P2 2 P1, P1 2 P0! . 0, cov~P3 2 P3' , P3'2 P2! . 0, and cov~P3'2 P2, P2 2 P1! , 0.
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market initially overreacts to the news, and later public news triggers fur-
ther overreaction to the initial private signal. More generally, Proposition 7
refutes the common casual equating of positive versus negative autocorre-
lations with underreaction versus overreaction to new information. Though
negative autocorrelations result from overreaction in the model, positive auto-
correlations also result from continuing overreaction ~followed by underreac-
tion in the correction of this error!.
Evidence from the psychological literature suggests that individuals tend
to be more overconfident in settings where feedback on their information or
decisions is slow or inconclusive than where the feedback is clear and rapid
~Einhorn ~1980!!. Thus, mispricing should be stronger in stocks that require
more judgment to evaluate, and where the feedback on this judgment is
ambiguous in the short run, such as for growth stocks whose value is, on
average, more strongly tied to hard-to-value growth options. This conjecture
is consistent with recent work by Daniel and Titman ~1998!, which finds
that the momentum effect is strong in growth stocks, but is weak or nonex-
istent in value stocks. This line of reasoning also suggests that momentum
should be stronger for stocks that are difficult to value, such as those with
high R&D expenditures or intangible assets.
B. A Dynamic Model of Outcome-Dependent Confidence
We now extend this model to an arbitrary number of periods and present
numerical simulations. The analysis implies patterns of security price-
change autocorrelations consistent with the findings of Section III.A above.
It also yields further implications for the correlation between public infor-
mation announcements ~such as managers’ forecasts or financial reports of
sales, cash f lows, or earnings! and future price changes.
B.1. The Model
We retain the basic structure considered in earlier sections. We assume
that the investor has a prior on the precision of his private signal, and uses
an updating rule that ref lects self-attribution bias. As before, the ~unobserv-
able! value of a share of the firm’s stock is Du ; N~0,su2 !. The public noise
variance su2 is common knowledge. At date 1, each informed investor re-
ceives a private signal Is1 5 Du 1 Ie, where Ie ; N~0,se2 !. At dates 2 through T,
a public signal Eft is released, Eft 5 Du 1 Iht , where Iht is i.i.d. and Iht ; N~0,sh2 !.
The variance of the noise, sh2 , is also common knowledge. Let Ft be the
average of all public signals through time t:
Ft 5
1
~t 2 1! (t52
t
Eft 5 u 1
1
~t 2 1! (t52
t
Iht . ~17!
The average public signal Ft is a sufficient statistic for the t 2 1 public
signals, and EFt ; N~u,sh2 0~t 2 1!!.
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As before, an informed investor forms expectations about value rationally
~using Bayesian updating! except for his perceptions of his private informa-
tion precision. The error variance se2 is incorrectly perceived by the investor.
He estimates se2 using an ad hoc rule described below. At time 1, the inves-
tor believes that the precision of his signal, vC,1 5 10sC,1
2 , is greater than the
true precision ve 5 10se
2 . At every subsequent release of public information
the investor updates his estimate of the noise variance. If the new public
signal ~ft! confirms the investor’s private signal s1, and the private signal
is not too far away from the public signal, then the investor becomes more
confident in his private signal. If the new public signal disconfirms his pri-
vate signal, the investor revises the estimated precision downward, but not
by as much. Thus, the specific updating rule that we implement is:
if 5
sign~s1 2 Ft21! 5 sign~ft 2 Ft21! and 6s1 2 Ft216 , 2sF, t
then vC, t 5 ~1 1 Tk!vC, t21
otherwise vC, t 5 ~1 2 tk!vC, t21,
~18!
where sF, t is the standard deviation of F at time t.
16 We impose the re-
striction that Tk . tk . 0. The ratio ~1 1 Tk!0~1 2 tk! is an index of the
investor’s attribution bias.17
B.2. The Equilibrium
Since the investor is risk neutral and the risk-free rate is zero, at each
point in time the stock price is the expectation of its terminal value:
Pt 5 EC @ Du6s1,f2, . . . ,ft # 5 EC @ Du6s1,Ft # . ~19!
Define vu 5 10su
2 and vh 5 10sh
2 . The price of the security at time t is given
by:
EPt 5 EC @ Du6s1,Ft # 5
~t 2 1!vh Ft 1 vC, t s1
vu 1 vh 1 vC, t
. ~20!
Recall that the precision of Ft is ~t 2 1!vh.
B.3. Simulation Results and Empirical Implications
For the simulation we use the parameters Tk 5 0.75, tk 5 0.1, su2 5 se2 5 1,
and sh2 5 7.5. We also make the investor’s initial estimate of his precision
equal to the true precision of his private signal. We perform this simulation
16 For tractability, we assume that the investor forms beliefs as if, at each point in time, he
knows his exact signal precision. Rationally he should allow for the fact that vC, t is an estimate.
We expect that the essential results are not sensitive to this simplification.
17 Several alternative ad hoc updating rules consistent with this intuition all lead to roughly
equivalent results.
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50,000 times, each time redrawing the value u, the private signal s1 5 u 1 e,
and the public information set ft , for t 5 2, . . .T.
It is useful to first illustrate the dynamic price path implied by the model
for specific realizations of s1 and u. Figure 2 shows the average price path
following a private signal of s1 5 1 when u 5 0, so that the informed inves-
tors’ signal is unduly favorable. The price initially jumps from 0 up to 0.5, a
rational assessment. On average, the price continues moving up, reaching a
maximum of 0.7366 in period 16. The average price then declines, and even-
tually asymptotes to zero. Thus, there is an initial overreaction phase in
which the price moves away from the true value as the investor’s attribution
bias causes him to place more weight, on average, on his private informa-
tion. Eventually the public information become precise enough that the in-
vestor revises his valuation of the security downward. This is the correction
phase. A similar hump-shaped pattern holds for an investors’ self-perceived
precision ~confidence! as a function of time. This changing confidence is the
source of the overreacting average price trend.
Figure 3 presents the unconditional average autocorrelations ~at lags be-
tween 1 period and 119 periods!, where Du and Is1 are now resampled for each
iteration. This figure confirms the intuition derived from Figure 2 that short-
lag price change autocorrelations should be positive and long-lag autocorre-
lations should be negative.
Period
Figure 2. Average price path following private information shock. This figure shows the
average price path calculated using the simulation in Section III.B.3, following a private infor-
mation shock s1 5 1. The price path is shown for the dynamic model with ~solid line! and
without ~dashed line! self-attribution bias.
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Several papers examine “long-horizon” regressions of long-period returns
on past returns ~see, e.g., Fama and French ~1988!! rather than long-lag
autocorrelations of short-period returns. In our model, it is straightforward
to show that there is a one-to-one mapping between price change autocor-
relations and more standard test statistics such as variance ratios or long-
horizon regression coefficients. In unreported simulations, these coefficients
exhibit behavior similar to that of the autocorrelations. Short-horizon re-
gression coefficients are positive and long-horizon ones are negative, consis-
tent with empirical literature on momentum and reversals.
The conclusions of this simulation are summarized as follows.
Result 1: In the biased self-attribution setting of Section III.B, if the true
share value u 5 0 and the initial private signal s1 5 1, then with sufficient
attribution bias the average price at first rises and then gradually declines.
This contrasts with a steadily declining price path if there is no attribution
bias. In the biased self-attribution setting, average self-perceived precision
also initially rises and then declines.
Result 2: In the biased self-attribution setting of Section III.B, short-lag
autocorrelations ~correlating single-period price changes with single-period
price changes! are positive and long-lag autocorrelations are negative.
Lag
Figure 3. Average price change autocorrelations. This figure presents the unconditional
average autocorrelations ~at lags between 1 period and 119 periods!, calculated using the sim-
ulation described in Section III.B.3.
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Result 3: In the biased self-attribution setting of Section III.B, short-term
autocorrelations are positive and long-horizon autocorrelations are negative.
Recent research indicates strong and consistent evidence of momentum in
the United States and in European countries, but weak and insignificant
evidence of momentum in Japan ~see, e.g., Haugen and Baker ~1996! and
Daniel, Titman, and Wei ~1996!!. There is corresponding evidence of a dif-
ference in biased self-attributions in Western versus Asian groups, espe-
cially Japan. For example, Kitayama, Takagi, and Matsumoto ~1995! review
twenty-three studies conducted in Japan which find essentially no evidence
of self-enhancing biases in attribution. These findings suggest the more gen-
eral prediction that cultures in which there is little or no self-enhancing
attribution bias ~e.g., other Asian countries such as Korea, PRC, and Tai-
wan; see the references in Kitayama et al. ~1995!! should have weak mo-
mentum effects.
De Long et al. ~1990a! have derived security return autocorrelations in a
model with mechanistic positive feedback traders. Our approach differs in
explicitly modeling the decisions of quasi-rational individuals. Our model
provides one possible psychological foundation for a stochastic tendency for
trades to be correlated with past price movements, which can create an ap-
pearance of positive feedback trading.
B.4. Correlation of Accounting Performance
with Subsequent Price Changes
Finally, we consider the implications of this model for the correlation be-
tween accounting performance and future price changes. Accounting infor-
mation ~sales, earnings, etc.! can be thought of as noisy public signals about
u, so in this subsection we interpret the fs as accounting performance change
measures. Consider the first public signal ~at t 5 2!. If this is positive, the
first private signal was probably also positive. Based on the momentum
results in this section, this suggests that prices will continue to increase
after the arrival date of the public signal, consistent with empirical evidence
on earnings-based return predictability. Eventually prices will decline as the
cumulative public signal becomes more precise and informed investors put
less weight on their signal. Thus, the analysis of this section suggests that
earnings-based return predictability, like stock-price momentum, may be a
phenomenon of continuing overreaction.18 In the long run, of course, the
security price will return to its full-information value, implying long-run
negative correlations between accounting performance and future price
changes. This conjecture is consistent with the empirical evidence discussed
in Appendix A, though from an empirical standpoint statistical power to
detect long-lag autocorrelations is limited.
18 The discussion of event-study implications in Section III.B.3 describes conditions under
which post-earnings announcement drift could be an underreaction effect.
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To evaluate the above conjecture, we again calculate average correlations
using our simulation as follows. For each Eft ~for t 5 2,120! we calculate the
“earnings” surprise, defined as
Det 5 Eft 2 Ft 5 Eft 2 E @ Eft 6f2,f3, . . . ,ft21# , ~21!
the deviation of ft from its expected value based on all past public signals.
Then, we calculate the set of sample correlations between the Det and price
changes t periods in the future DPt1t 5 Pt1t 2 Pt1t21. These correlations are
then averaged over the Monte Carlo draws. The average correlations are
plotted in Figure 4. This simulation yields the following result.
Result 4: In the biased self-attribution setting of Section III.B, short-lag
correlations between single-period stock price changes and past earnings are
positive, and long-lag correlations can be positive or negative.
To summarize, the analysis suggests that the conclusion from the basic
model that investors overreact to private signals holds in the dynamic model.
Though investors underreact on average to public signals, public signals
initially tend to stimulate additional overreaction to a previous private sig-
nal. Thus, underreaction is mixed with continuing overreaction.
Lag
Figure 4. Correlation between information changes and future price changes. This
figure shows the set of average sample correlations between the Det and price changes t periods
in the future DPt1t 5 Pt1t 2 Pt1t21. These are calculated using the simulated dynamic model
of Section III.B.3.
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In the model of this section, earnings-based return predictability and mo-
mentum both arise from self-attribution bias. Further, the literature cited in
Section III.B.3 suggests that the magnitude of this bias varies systemati-
cally across countries. Based on these observations, the self-attribution model
suggests a positive relationship across international markets between the
strength of the momentum effect and that of the post-earnings announce-
ment drift.
IV. Conclusion
Empirical securities markets research in the last three decades has pre-
sented a body of evidence with systematic patterns that are not easy to
explain with rational asset pricing models. Some studies conclude that the
market underreacts to information, others find evidence of overreaction. We
have lacked a theory to integrate this evidence, and to make predictions
about when over- or underreaction will occur.
This paper develops a theory based on investor overconfidence and on
changes in confidence resulting from biased self-attribution of investment
outcomes. The theory implies that investors overreact to private information
signals and underreact to public information signals. In contrast with the
common correspondence of positive ~negative! return autocorrelations with
underreaction ~overreaction! to new information, we show that positive re-
turn autocorrelations can be a result of continuing overreaction. This is fol-
lowed by long-run correction. Thus, short-run positive autocorrelations can
be consistent with long-run negative autocorrelations.
The theory also offers an explanation for the phenomenon of average pub-
lic event stock price reactions of the same sign as post-event long-run ab-
normal returns. This pattern has sometimes been interpreted as market
underreaction to the event. We show that underreaction to new public in-
formation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for such event-
based predictability. Such predictability can arise from underreaction only if
the event is chosen in response to market mispricing. Alternatively, predict-
ability can arise when the public event triggers a continuing overreaction.
For example, post-earnings announcement drift may be a continuing over-
reaction triggered by the earnings announcement to pre-event information.
The basic noise trading approach to securities markets ~e.g., Grossman
and Stiglitz ~1980!, Shiller ~1984!, Kyle ~1985!, Glosten and Milgrom ~1985!,
Black ~1986!, De Long et al. ~1990b!, and Campbell and Kyle ~1993!! posits
that there is variability in prices arising from unpredictable trading that
seems unrelated to valid information. Our approach is based on the premise
that an important class of mistakes by investors involves the misinterpre-
tation of genuine new private information. Thus, our model endogenously
generates trading mistakes that are correlated with fundamentals. Modeling
the decision problems of quasi-rational traders imposes restrictions on trade
distributions which are not obvious if distributions are imposed exogenously.
This structure provides predictions about the dynamic behavior of asset prices
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which depend on the particular cognitive error that is assumed. For exam-
ple, underconfidence also gives rise to quasi-rational trading that is corre-
lated with fundamentals, but leads to empirical predictions that are the
reverse of what the empirical literature finds. Specifically, if informed in-
vestors are underconfident ~sC2 . se2 !, there is insufficient volatility relative
to the rational level, long-run return continuation, and negative correlation
between selective events such as repurchase and post-event returns. Of course,
one could arbitrarily specify whatever pattern of correlated noise is needed
to match empirically observed ex post price patterns. Such an exercise would
merely be a relabeling of the puzzle, not a theory. Instead, we examine a
form of irrationality consistent with well-documented psychological biases,
and our key contribution is to show that these biases induce several of the
anomalous price patterns documented in the empirical literature.
Some models of exogenous noise trades ~e.g., De Long et al. ~1990b!, Camp-
bell and Kyle ~1993!! also imply long-run reversals and excess volatility be-
cause of the time-varying risk premia induced by these trades. Our approach
additionally reconciles long-run reversals with short-term momentum, ex-
plains event-based return predictability, and offers several other distinct em-
pirical predictions ~see Sections II.B.1 through II.B.3!. As noted in the
introduction, a possible objection to models with imperfectly rational traders
is that wealth may shift from foolish to rational traders until price setting is
dominated by rational traders. For example, in our model the overconfident
informed traders lose money on average. This outcome is similar to the stan-
dard result that informed investors cannot profit from trading with un-
informed investors unless there is some “noise” or “supply shock.” However,
recent literature has shown that in the long run rational traders may not
predominate. De Long et al. ~1990b, 1991! point out that if traders are risk
averse, a trader who underestimates risk will allocate more wealth to risky,
high expected return assets. If risk-averse traders are overconfident about
genuine information signals ~as in our model!, overconfidence allows them
to exploit information more effectively. Thus, the expected profits of the over-
confident can be greater than those of the fully rational ~see Daniel et al.
~1998!!.
Furthermore, owing to biased self-attribution, those who acquire wealth
through successful investment may become more overconfident ~see also Ger-
vais and Odean ~1998!!. Another distinct benefit of overconfidence is that it
can act like a commitment to trade aggressively. Because this may intimi-
date competing informed traders, those known to be overconfident may earn
higher returns ~see Kyle and Wang ~1997! and Benos ~1998!!.
Recent evidence suggests that event-based return predictability varies across
stocks ~e.g., Brav and Gompers ~1997!!. Moving beyond the confines of the
formal model, we expect the effects of overconfidence to be more severe in
less liquid securities and assets. Suppose that all investors are risk averse
and that prices are not fully revealing ~perhaps because of noisy liquidity
trading!. If rational arbitrageurs face fixed setup costs of learning about a
stock, then large liquid stocks will tend to be better arbitraged ~more ratio-
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nally priced! than small stocks, because it is easier to cover the fixed inves-
tigation cost in large, liquid stocks. This suggests greater inefficiencies for
small stocks than for large stocks, and for less liquid securities and assets
such as real estate than for stocks. Furthermore, because the model is based
on overconfidence about private information, the model predicts that return
predictability will be strongest in firms with the greatest information asym-
metries. This also implies greater inefficiencies in the stock prices of small
companies. Furthermore, proxies for information asymmetry such as the
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread should also be positively
related to momentum, reversal, and post-event drift.
It is an open question whether the overconfident traders in the model can
be identified with a specific category of investor, such as institutions, other
investment professionals, small individual investors, or all three. Even small
individual investors, who presumably have less information, may still be
overconfident. The uninformed investors of the model could be interpreted
as being contrarian-strategy investors ~whether institutions or individuals!.
~Some smart contrarian investors could be viewed as rational and informed,
and including such traders would not change the qualitative nature of the
model predictions.! An identification of the confidence characteristics of dif-
ferent observable investor categories may generate further empirical impli-
cations, and is an avenue for further research.
Appendix A: Securities Price Patterns
This appendix cites the relevant literature for the anomalies mentioned in
the first paragraph of the introduction. Out-of-sample tests ~in time and
location! have established several of these patterns as regularities.
Underreaction to Public News Events (event-date average stock returns of the
same sign as average subsequent long-run abnormal performance)
Events for which this has been found include:
1. Stock splits ~Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman ~1984!, Desai and Jain
~1997!, and Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice ~1996!!
2. Tender offer and open market repurchases ~Lakonishok and Vermaelen
~1990!, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen ~1995!!
3. Analyst recommendations ~Groth et al. ~1979!, Bjerring, Lakonishok,
and Vermaelen ~1983!, Elton et al. ~1984!, Womack ~1996!, and Michaely
and Womack ~1996!!,
4. Dividend initiations and omissions ~Michaely, Womack, and Thaler ~1995!!
5. Seasoned issues of common stock ~Loughran and Ritter ~1995!, Spiess
and Aff leck-Graves ~1995!, Teoh, Welch, and Wong ~1998!, but see the
differing evidence for Japan of Kang, Kim, and Stulz ~1996!!
6. Earnings surprises ~at least for a period after the event! ~Bernard and
Thomas 1989, 1990!, Brown and Pope ~1996!!
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7. Public announcement of previous insider trades ~Seyhun ~1997!; see
also Seyhun ~1986, 1987! and Rozeff and Zaman ~1988!!
8. Venture capital share distributions ~Gompers and Lerner ~1997!!.
There is also evidence that earnings forecasts underreact to public news,
such as quarterly earnings announcements ~Abarbanell ~1991!, Abarbanell
and Bernard ~1992!, Mendenhall ~1991!!. An event inconsistent with this
generalization is exchange listing ~McConnell and Sanger ~1987!, Dharan
and Ikenberry ~1995!!. Fama ~1998! argues that some of these anomalous
return patterns are sensitive to empirical methodology. On the other hand,
Loughran and Ritter ~1998! argue that the methodology favored by Fama
minimizes the power to detect possible misvaluation effects.
Short-Term Momentum (positive short-term autocorrelation of stock returns,
for individual stocks and the market as a whole)
See Jegadeesh and Titman ~1993! and Daniel ~1996!. “Short” here refers to
periods on the order of six to twelve months. At very short horizons there is
negative autocorrelation in individual stock returns ~Jegadeesh ~1990!, Le-
hmann ~1990!!, probably resulting from bid-ask spreads and other measure-
ment problems ~Kaul and Nimalendran ~1990!!.
Rouwenhorst ~1998a! finds evidence of momentum in twelve European
countries. The effect is stronger for smaller firms. However, Haugen and
Baker ~1996! and Daniel ~1996! show that, although there is evidence of a
strong book-to-market effect in Japan, there is little or no evidence of a
momentum effect. Rouwenhorst ~1998a! reports a strong momentum effect
within and across twelve European countries, and Rouwenhorst ~1998b! finds
evidence that momentum, firm size, and value predict common stock returns
in twenty emerging markets.
Long-Term Reversal (negative autocorrelation of short-term
returns separated by long lags, or “overreaction”)
Cross-sectionally, see DeBondt and Thaler ~1985, 1987!, and Chopra, La-
konishok, and Ritter ~1992!; on robustness issues, see Fama and French
~1996! and Ball, Kothari, and Shanken ~1995!. For the aggregate market,
see Fama and French ~1988! and Poterba and Summers ~1988!; internation-
ally, see Richards ~1997!. On the robustness of the finding in the post-WWII
period, see Kim, Nelson, and Startz ~1988!, Carmel and Young ~1997!, As-
ness ~1995!, and Daniel ~1996!; the latter two papers show that in post-
WWII U.S. data, significant cross-sectional ~Asness! and aggregate ~Daniel!
long-horizon negative autocorrelations are partly masked by a momentum
effect ~positive serial correlation! at approximately a one-year horizon.
Unconditional Excess Volatility of Asset Prices Relative to Fundamentals
See Shiller ~1981, 1989!; for critical assessments of this conclusion, see
Kleidon ~1986! and Marsh and Merton ~1986!.
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Abnormal Stock Price Performance in the Opposite Direction
of Long-Term Earnings Changes
DeBondt and Thaler ~1987!, and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny ~1994!
find a negative relation between long-horizon returns and past financial
performance measures such as earnings or sales growth; see however DeChow
and Sloan ~1997!. This implies that one or more short-horizon, long-lag re-
gression coefficients must be negative ~proof available on request!. In con-
trast, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok ~1996! do not reject the null of no
such a negative relation, perhaps owing to a lack of power in detecting long-
run reversals. Also, La Porta et al. ~1997! find large positive returns for
value stocks on earnings announcement dates ~and negative for growth stocks!.
Appendix B: Covariance and Variance Calculations for the Basic Model
Covariances and Variances of Section II.B
~All signs are under the overconfidence assumption that se2 . sC2.!
From equation ~6!, the covariance between the date 3 and the date 2 price
changes is
















This is positive because se2 . sC2 .
The covariance between the date 1 price change and the date 2 price change
is















which, with overconfidence, is negative. The average of the two preceding
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and is also negative. It is also easy to show that
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Because P3 5 u, using the expression for P2 in equation ~6!, we have





















which is positive as long as sC2 , se2 .
Proof of Proposition 3: The variance of the date 2 price change is




















which can either increase or decrease in sC2 . The date 1 price volatility,









decreases with sC2 .
The unconditional volatility is just the average of var ~P3 2 P2!,
var~P2 2 P1!, and var~P1 2 P0!,
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2 !2 G. ~B9!
When there is no overconfidence, sC2 5 se2 , which reduces to su2 03. The
excess volatility is the difference between the above expression and su2 03,
which is positive so long as there is overconfidence, sC2 , se2 .
We now calculate var~P1 2 P0! and var~P2 2 P1! when informed agents are
rational ~subscripted by R!:
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and se4~sC2 1 su2 !2 @sC2~sp2 1 su2 ! 1 sp2 su2 !2 # , and is therefore positive under
overconfidence ~se2 . se2 !. Thus, the proportional difference between over-
confident and rational volatilities is greater at date 1 than at date 2.
Proofs of Some Claims in Section B.3
Proof of Part 1 of Proposition 4: Denote the date 2 mispricing as M2.
Suppressing arguments on P2R~s2! and P2C~s2!, we have that M2 5 P2
R 2 P2C 5
2E @u 2 P2C~s2!6s1,s2# . By the properties of normal random variables, this
implies that the variable x 5 u 2 P2C 1 M2, which is the residual from the
regression of u 2 P2C on s1 and s2, is orthogonal to s1 and s2. Suppose we pick
a variable y 5 f ~s1,s2! which is orthogonal to M2. Such a variable will be
orthogonal to x, so that we have cov~u 2 P2C 1 M2, y! 5 0. By construction,
cov~M2, y! 5 0, so it follows from the linearity of the covariance operator
that cov~u 2 P2C , y! 5 0. A converse argument shows that if we pick a vari-
able y ' 5 g~s1,s2! which is orthogonal to the post-event return u 2 P2
C then
cov~M2, y
' ! 5 0. Thus, all functions of s1 and s2 are orthogonal to M2 if and
only if they are orthogonal to the post-event return u 2 P2C .
For the specific case when the event depends linearly on s2, by equa-
tion ~6!,
P3 2 P2 5
sC
2 sp
2 u 2 sp
2 su










Because s2 [ u 1 h, from the above expression it immediately follows that
cov~P3 2 P2,s2! 5 0, thus showing that events that depend only on s2 are
nonselective.
Proof of Part 2 of Proposition 4: By standard results for calculating con-
ditional variances of normal variables ~Anderson ~1984!!,
















which is positive under overconfidence ~sC2 . se2 !.
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Proof of Proposition 5: Using standard normal distribution properties,




























which is a constant ~for a given level of confidence!. Thus, selective events
can alternatively be viewed as events that are linearly related to e*. High
values of e* signify overpricing and low values underpricing. The proposi-
tion follows by observing that









































By the conditioning properties of mean-zero normal distributions,
cov~P3 2 P2,e
* ! , 0; therefore E @P3 2 P2 6e
* # can be written in the
form ke*, where k , 0 is a constant. Thus, E @P3 2 P26e
* # , 0 if and
only if e * . 0. This holds for each positive realization of e * , and so
E @P3 2 P26e
* . 0# , 0. By symmetric reasoning, E @P3 2 P26e
* , 0# . 0.
The result for event-date price reactions uses a similar method. Because
cov~P2 2 P1,e
* ! , 0, it follows that E @P2 2 P16e
* # , 0 if and only if e* . 0.
Proof of Proposition 6: We interpret the “fundamental0price” ratio or “run-
up” as Nu 2 P1. For part 1,















By our assumption that the selective event is linearly related to e*, the
selective event is positively correlated with the mispricing measure, proving
part 1.
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This implies that the distribution of e* conditional on u 1 e is normal with
mean




~u 1 e! ~B22!
and variance




~u 1 e!. ~B23!
The complement of the standardized cumulative normal distribution func-
tion of a normal random variable with nonzero mean and variance is in-
creasing in its mean. Because E @e* 6u 1 e# is proportional to u 1 e, the
probability conditional on P1 that e
* exceeds a given threshold value ~indi-
cating occurrence of the positive event! is increasing in u 1 e. The reverse
holds for a negative event, proving part ~2!.
Appendix C: Discrete Model of Outcome-Dependent Overconfidence
At time 0, u has a value of 11 or 21 and an expected value of zero. At time
1, the player receives a signal s1, and, at time 2, a signal s2. s1 may be either
H or L, and s2 may be either U or D. After each signal, the player updates
his prior expected value of u.
Pr~s1 5 H 6u 5 11! 5 p 5 Pr~s1 5 L6u 5 21!, ~C1!
Pr~s2 5 U 6u 5 11! 5 q 5 Pr~s2 5 D 6u 5 21!. ~C2!
The probabilities that u 5 11, given s1 and s2 are
Pr~u 5 116s1 5 H ! 5
Pr~s1 5 H 6u 5 11!Pr~u 5 11!
Pr~s1 5 H !
5
p02
p02 1 ~1 2 p!02
5 p. ~C3!
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When s2 confirms s1 ~either s1 5 H and s2 5 U or s1 5 L and s2 5 D!, the
player becomes overconfident and acts as if his precision were pC instead of
p, so
Pr~u 5 116s1 5 H,s2 5 U ! 5
Pr~s1 5 H,s2 5 U 6u 5 11!Pr~u 5 11!
Pr~s1 5 H,s2 5 U !
5
pC q
pC ~2q 2 1! 1 ~1 2 q!
. ~C4!
When s2 is informative ~q . 102!, this probability exceeds pC . When s2 does
not confirm s1, the player does not become overconfident, so
Pr~u 5 116s1 5 H,s2 5 D! 5
Pr~s1 5 H,s2 5 D 6u 5 11!Pr~u 5 11!
Pr~s1 5 H,s2 5 D!
5
p~1 2 q!
p~1 2 q! 1 q~1 2 p!
. ~C5!
When evaluated with an informative signal s2 ~q . 102!, this probability is
less than p. With a risk-neutral player, the price of the asset with value u
can be calculated linearly using the preceding probabilities. The price at
time 0 ~P0! is, by definition, equal to 0. As u can take on a value of 11 or 21,
the price is ~ r!~11! 1 ~1 2 r!~2 1! or, 2r 2 1, where r is the probability that
u is 11.
P16s15H 5 2P16s15L 5 2Pr~u 5 116s1 5 H ! 2 1 5 2p 2 1 ~C6!
P2 6s15H,s25U 5 2P2 6s15L,s25D 5 2Pr~u 5 116s1 5 H,s2 5 U ! 2 1
5
pC 1 q 2 1
pC ~2q 2 1! 1 ~1 2 q!
~C7!
P2 6s15H,s25D 5 2P2 6s15L,s25U 5 2Pr~u 5 116s1 5 H,s2 5 D! 2 1
5
p 2 q
p 1 q 2 2pq
. ~C8!
The price changes are DP1 5 P1 2 P0 5 P1 and DP2 5 P2 2 P1. E @P1# 5 0, so
cov~DP1,DP2! 5 E @DP1 DP2# . The probabilities of the eight possible outcomes
are:
Pr~u 5 11,s1 5 H,s2 5 U ! 5 Pr~u 5 21,s1 5 L,s2 5 D! 5 pq02 ~C9!
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Pr~u 5 21,s1 5 H,s2 5 U ! 5 Pr~u 5 11,s1 5 L,s2 5 D! 5 ~1 2 p!~1 2 q!02
~C10!
Pr~u 5 1 1,s1 5 H,s2 5 D! 5 Pr~u 5 21,s1 5 L,s2 5 U ! 5 p ~1 2 q!02 ~C11!
Pr~u 5 21,s1 5 H,s2 5 D! 5 Pr~u 5 1 1,s1 5 L,s2 5 U ! 5 ~1 2 p! q02. ~C12!
The product DP1 DP2 can only take on two values, based on the various sig-
nal combinations:
X [ @DP1 DP2#s15H,s25U 5 @DP1 DP2#s15L,s25D
5 ~2p 2 1!S pC 1 q 2 1pC ~2q 2 1! 1 ~1 2 q! 2 ~2p 2 1!D. ~C13!
Y [ @DP1 DP2#s15H,s25D 5 @DP1 DP2#s15L,s25U
5 ~2p 2 1!S p 2 qp 1 q 2 2p 2 ~2p 2 1!D. ~C14!
Combining, E @DP1 DP2# can be written as ~1 2 a! X 1 aY, where a 5 p 1 q 2
2pq. After some calculation, the two components of this expression become:
~1 2 a!X 5
2~2p 2 1!~2pq 2 p 2 q 1 1!~ pC p 1 pC q 1 pq 2 2pC pq 2 p!
pC ~2q 2 1! 1 ~1 2 q!
~C15!
aY 5 2p~2q 2 1!~2p 2 1!~ p 2 1!. ~C16!
Combining these two terms and a great deal of factoring produces the final
result,
E @DP1 DP2# 5
2q~2p 2 1!~ pC 2 p!~1 2 q!
pC ~2q 2 1! 1 ~1 2 q!
. 0. ~C17!
When there is no overconfidence ~ pC 5 p! this expression is zero and price
changes are uncorrelated.
A Second Noisy Public Signal
The model so far shows that overreaction can be exaggerated by a possible
rise in confidence triggered by a noisy public signal. We now add a second
noisy public signal to consider whether correction of mispricing is gradual.
Signal s3' follows s2 and can take on values G or B. The precision of this
signal is as follows:
Pr~s3' 5 G 6u 5 11! 5 r 5 Pr~s3' 5 B 6u 5 21!. ~C18!
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This signal does not affect confidence. If the player becomes overconfident
~and replaces p with pC ! after s2, then the player will continue to use pC as
his measure of the precision of s1, regardless of whether s3' confirms s1. As
there are two possible prices after the first signal and four possible prices
after the second, there are eight possible prices after observation of the third
signal. As above, by symmetry, only half of these prices need to be calcu-
lated. Using the conditional probabilities, the period three prices are:
P3' 6s15H,s25U,s3'5G 5
pC qr 2 ~1 2 pC !~1 2 q!~1 2 r!
pC qr 1 ~1 2 pC !~1 2 q!~1 2 r!
; ~C19!
P3' 6s15H,s25U,s3'5B 5
pC q~1 2 r! 2 ~1 2 pC !~1 2 q!r
pC q~1 2 r! 1 ~1 2 pC !~1 2 q!r
; ~C20!
P3' 6s15H,s25D,s3'5G 5
p~1 2 q!r 2 ~1 2 p!q~1 2 r!
p~1 2 q!r 1 ~1 2 p!q~1 2 r!
; ~C21!
P3' 6s15H,s25D,s3'5B 5
p~1 2 q!~1 2 r! 2 ~1 2 p!qr
p~1 2 q!~1 2 r! 1 ~1 2 p!qr
. ~C22!
With two possible values for u, there are now sixteen possible sets of
$u,s1,s2,s3' % realizations. Only $s1,s2,s3' % are observed by the player, result-
ing in eight sets of possible signal realizations. When calculating the covari-
ances of price changes, only half of these realizations can result in unique
products of price changes, so we define
Aij [ DPi DPj 6H,U,G 5 DPi DPj 6L, D, B ; ~C23!
Bij [ DPi DPj 6H,U, B 5 DPi DPj 6L, D,G ; ~C24!
Cij [ DPi DPj 6H, D,G 5 DPi DPj 6L,U, B ; ~C25!
Dij [ DPi DPj 6H, D, B 5 DPi DPj 6L,U,G . ~C26!
Each of these four possible products must then be weighted by its probabil-
ity of occurrence in order to calculate the expected value of the products of
the price changes ~the expected value of each price is zero!. The weights for
the Aij component of covariance are:
Pr~H,U,G 6u 5 11! 1 Pr~H,U,G 6u 5 21! 5 pqr02 1 ~1 2 p!~1 2 q!~1 2 r!02,
~C27!
Pr~L, D, B 6u 5 21! 1 Pr~L, D, B 6u 5 21! 5 pqr02 1 ~1 2 p!~1 2 q!~1 2 r!02.
~C28!
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Proceeding in this manner, the covariances are:
E @DPi DPj# 5 @ pqr 1 ~1 2 p!~1 2 q!~1 2 r!#Aij
1 @ pq~1 2 r! 1 ~1 2 p!~1 2 q!r#Bij
1 @ p~1 2 q!r 1 ~1 2 p!q~1 2 r!#Cij
1 @ p~1 2 q!~1 2 r! 1 ~1 2 p!qr#Dij . ~C29!
~Earlier calculations of E @DP1 DP2# had A12 5 B12 5 X and C12 5 D12 5 Y,
with the r and 1 2 r factors from s3' summing to one.! To simplify the alge-
bra, temporarily let all signals have the same precision ~i.e., q 5 r 5 p!, with
pC replacing p as the perceived precision of the first signal if overconfidence
occurs. Direct calculation of the covariances then shows that
E @DP1 DP2#r5q5p 5
2p~1 2 p!~2p 2 1!~ pC 2 p!
pC ~2p 2 1! 1 1 2 p
. 0; ~C30!
E @DP1 DP3' #r5q5p 5
2ppC ~ p 2 1!~ pC 2 p!~1 2 pC !~2p 2 1!3
@ pC ~2p 2 1! 1 1 2 p# @ pC ~2p 2 1! 1 ~1 2 p!2 #
, 0; ~C31!
E @DP2 DP3' #r5q5p 5
4p2pC ~ p 2 1!2~ pC 2 p!~ pC 2 1!~2p 2 1!2~2pC 2 1!
@ pC ~2p 2 1! 1 1 2 p# 2 @ pC ~2p 2 1! 1 ~1 2 p!2 #
, 0.
~C32!
By direct comparison, E @DP1 DP2#r5q5p and E @DP2 DP3' #r5q5p are related by:
E @DP2 DP3' #r5q5p 5 2
2p~1 2 p!pC ~1 2 pC !~2p 2 1!~2pC 2 1!
@ pC ~2p 2 1! 1 ~1 2 p!# @ pC ~2p 2 1! 1 ~1 2 p!2 #
3 E @DP1 DP2#r5q5p , ~C33!
so the covariance between the date 2 and 3 price changes is negatively pro-
portional to the covariance of the date 1 and 2 price changes. Consider the
numerator N of the proportionality factor. The first three components,
2p~1 2 p!, are maximized when p 5 102; the next two components, pC~1 2
pC !, are maximized when pC 5 102. Because the last two components satisfy
~2p 2 1!~2pC 2 1! , 1, the N # 108. In the denominator D, the expression
pC~2p 2 1! 1 ~1 2 p! is minimized when pC 5 p 5 102, resulting in a mini-
mum of 102. The second component of D is similarly minimized when pC 5
p 5 102, resulting in a minimum of 104. So D $ 108. Because N # 108, the
ratio N0D # 1. Therefore, the negative covariance between date 2 and date
3 price changes must be, in absolute value, less than or equal to the positive
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covariance between period one and period two price changes, resulting in an
overall one-period covariance that is positive. When q 5 r differs from p,
direct calculation of covariances shows:
E @DP1 DP2#r5q . 0; ~C34!
E @DP1 DP3' #r5q , 0; ~C35!
E @DP2 DP3' #r5q , 0. ~C36!
Now let the signal s3' have a precision of r that differs from both precisions
of p and q. Proceeding as above, the covariances satisfy
E @DP1 DP2# . 0; ~C37!
E @DP1 DP3' # , 0; ~C38!
E @DP2 DP3' # , 0; ~C39!
E @DP3'DP3# . 0; ~C40!
E @DP1 DP3# , 0, ~C41!
The magnitude of E @DP2 DP3' # varies nonmonotonically with q. As r rises
~the precision of s3' is increased!, direct calculation shows that E @DP2 DP3' #
becomes more negative ~increases in absolute value!. As r r 0.5, this covari-
ance approaches zero. Thus, when the second noisy public signal is not very
informative, this negative single-lag covariance becomes arbitrarily small in
absolute value.
Confidence increases when s2 confirms s1, but its effects are mitigated as
s2 becomes more informative. Thus, an increase in the precision of s2 has an
ambiguous effect on E @DP2 DP3' # . This increase results in a greater likeli-
hood of overconfidence occurring, yet also places greater, rational, confi-
dence in s2 itself, yielding less leverage to the effects of overconfidence. ~At
the extreme, a value of q equal to one yields the greatest chances of s2
confirming s1, yet results in zero values for all covariances as the perfect
information of s2 entirely determines all subsequent prices.! Based on sim-
ulation, it appears that the greater information resulting from higher values
of q tends to overshadow the increased likelihood of overconfidence, result-
ing in generally lower absolute values for E @DP2 DP3' # .
Larger values of r, the precision of s3' , result in more negative values of
E @DP2 DP3' # . In this case, a more informative second noisy public signal can
only place less weight on previous signals and result in a stronger correction
of the previous overreaction. Thus, the final one-period covariance is more
negative as the precision of s3' rises.
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Appendix D: Covariance Calculations
for the Dynamic Model (Section III.A.1)
Since the probability p is an exogenous constant, and the probability that
the date 1 price move was positive is 102, by the law of iterated expectations
cov~P2 2 P1, P1 2 P0! 5 Es2 @E @$~P2 2 P1!~P1 2 P0!%6s2##
5
ksu4~su2 1 se2 !
2~su2 1 sC2 !2~su2 1 sC2 2 k!
. 0; ~D1!
cov~P3 2 P2, P2 2 P1! 5 Es2 @E$$~P3 2 P2!~P2 2 P1!%6s2%#
5 2
su
2 @k2su2 1 k~se2 2 sC2 !#
2~su2 1 sC2 !~su2 1 sC2 2 k!2
, 0. ~D2!
Further,









Direct calculation shows that




2 F sC2~se2 2 sC2 !~su2 1 sC2 !2 @su2~sC2 1 sp2 ! 1 sC2 sp2 #
1
~sC
2 2 k!~se2 1 k 2 sC2 !
~su
2 1 sC
2 2 k!2 @su2~sC2 2 k 1 sp2 ! 1 ~sC2 2 k!sp2 #
G . 0; ~D4!
cov~P3 2 P, P2 2 P1!
5 2
ksp2 su4~k 1 se2 2 sC2 !
2~sC2 2 k 1 su2 !@~sC2 2 k!~su2 1 sp2 ! 1 sp2 su2 #
, 0; ~D5!
cov~P3 2 P3' , P1 2 P0!
5 2
1








2 2 k!~su2 1 sp2 ! 1 sp2 su2 #
G , 0; ~D6!
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cov~P3' 2 P2, P1 2 P0!
5 2
1




2 2 k!~k 1 se2 2 sC2 !
~su
2 1 sC
2 2 k!@~sC2 2 k!~su2 1 sp2 ! 1 sp2 su2 #
G , 0; ~D7!
and that
cov~P3' 2 P2, P2 2 P1!
5 2
ksu6~sC2 2 k!~se2 1 k 2 sC2 !
2~sC2 1 su2 2 k!2 @sp2 su2 1 ~sp2 1 su2 !~sC2 2 k!#
, 0. ~D8!
The three single-lag contiguous covariances are given by equations ~D1!,
~D4!, and ~D8!. Comparing the covariances ~D1! and ~D8!, it is evident that
the sum of these two covariances will be negative so long as sp2 is suffi-
ciently large because the latter ~negative! covariance varies inversely with
sp
2 and the former covariance does not depend on sp2 . The covariance in ~D4!
is always positive, so unconditional momentum ~defined as the simple arith-
metic average of the three single covariances! obtains if sp2 is sufficiently
small.
As k r 0, the covariance in equation ~D8! goes to zero, and the covariance
in equation ~D4! remains strictly positive. Thus, if k is sufficiently small, the
sum of these two covariances will be positive. Because equation ~D1! is al-
ways nonnegative, unconditional momentum will obtain if k is sufficiently
small.
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